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Abstract— A review by the National Audit Office of the 
National Cyber Security Programme recommended a more 
robust performance framework, to understand the impact of the 
Programme and to focus activities going forward. The Directive 
on security of network and information systems (the NIS 
Directive) has placed responsibility for essential aspects of supply 
chains on Operators of Essential Services (OES). Our 
dependence on international supply chains also requires a 
performance framework to assist cybersecurity improvements in 
this area. The following sections describe work to investigate the 
implementation of the NIS Directive by Competent Authorities 
(CA) and OES and proposes a framework to monitor 
performance across interdependencies. This is to enable 
development of a more effective set of performance metrics to 
guide interventions and improvements in cybersecurity for 
critical infrastructure.  
Keywords—cybersecurity, resilience, critical infrastructure, 
metrics, supply chains 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
A review by the National Audit Office looking at the 
progress of the National Cyber Security Programme has 
recommended a better understanding of the areas of greatest 
impact and importance, to focus activities during the 
remainder of the Programme and to develop a new approach 
to transition beyond the current Strategy and Programme [1]. 
There have been challenges with managing programme 
risks due to not having in place a robust performance 
framework. The Cabinet Office reported low confidence in the 
evidence behind metrics that were intended to track 
performance across the National Cyber Security Programme. 
The National Audit Office showed either low confidence or 
moderate confidence in the strategic outcomes being achieved, 
for those they were able to publicly report progress on. With 
regard to Critical Infrastructure (CI) fewer than 80% of the CI 
projects were expected to be achieved [1]. 
The overarching themes of the National Cyber Security 
Programme are: 
 
• Deterrence – detection and countermeasures, 
reducing impact of cyber events.  
• Defend – protection and incident response, guidance 
regulation and incentives to manage cyber risks.  
• Develop – building expertise and capability.  
• International activity – partnerships, increased 
consensus & capability, responsible behaviour. 
• Governance – policies, organisations, structures for 
effective response to the threat [1]. 
 
The Defend theme includes Critical National Infrastructure 
activities which the Cabinet Office oversees, while the 
Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) 
hold responsibility for all other businesses under this objective 
[1]. The overarching governance of this cross-government 
approach, to maximise effectiveness, requires careful 
measurement to understand its actual impact.  
 
The Directive on security of network and information 
systems (NIS Directive) was transposed into UK law in May 
2018 in response to EU aims to raise the level of cyber 
security across member states [2]. It brings a focus to the 
resilience of our essential services in Energy, Water, 
Transport, Health & Finance.  
Implementing the NIS Directive began with the National 
Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) defining a set of principles, 
shown in Figure 1, to aid decision making in securing essential 
services and a Cyber Assessment Framework (CAF) 
indicating best practices [2].  
  
Figure 1 NIS Objectives 
The CAF has been adapted for each sector by working 
with the sectoral Competent Authorities (CA) [2]. The 
Operators of Essential Services (OES) have been obliged to 
complete self-assessments against the CAF. This has resulted 
in a body of knowledge and evidence across several Critical 
Infrastructure sectors on the cyber security level of our 
essential services. This can form a basis for future decision 
making on cybersecurity improvements [3]. 
II. METHODOLOGY 
At a more generic level, this project explores the nexus 
between evidence-based research methods for science and 
engineering and public policy. It describes the use of 
qualitative methods, based on focus groups, interviews and 
active research tools to identify putative metrics with which to 
assess the comparative strengths of NIS implementation both 
across sectors within the UK and more widely throughout our 
international supply chains. It demonstrates the importance of 
cyber security researchers engaging with policy to aid CAs 
and NCSC in meeting the expectations of lead government 
departments. The project is engaging with three different 
Critical Infrastructure sectors, through semi-structured 
interviews with OES and CA in those sectors, as well as 
meetings with NCSC and lead Government Departments, to 
assess the progress of the NIS Directive. This engagement 
includes action-based research to assist stakeholders, where 
appropriate, to meet their objectives within the National Cyber 
Security Strategy.  
 
III. FRAMEWORKS 
Government needs to provide the frameworks to support 
the cybersecurity of our critical infrastructure, with incentives 
to drive the required behaviours and improvements. The 
Boards of each OES need to invest appropriately to manage 
the risks to critical systems and essential services. Ongoing 
effort from both the public and private sector is essential to 
keep up with changing threats and new technologies [4]. 
 
Public-private ‘partnerships’ are often described as being a 
‘cornerstone’ of cybersecurity however clear lines of 
responsibility and accountability need to be defined as each 
side of the partnership has its own perspective. The private 
sector emphasises economic promotion and pays closest 
attention to the financial and reputational aspects of 
cybersecurity while the public sector retains responsibility for 
national security [5].  
 
With most of critical infrastructure being privately owned, 
the combined provision of security by public and private 
actors requires a clearly defined arrangement [5].  The NIS 
Directive depends on OES knowing their own operating 
environments best and understanding the risks of their 
particular deployment of technology. The NIS Directive, being 
non-prescriptive, assumes OES are best placed to take 
appropriate steps to achieve the NIS outcomes against the 
backdrop of their risk appetite. Having a clear understanding 
of the risk appetite of the Board provides the context for how 
the NIS Directive is implemented [6]. This may or may not 
align with the government’s perspective on national security 
as a public good.  
 
The assumption that the private sector can invest in 
cybersecurity “beyond its cost/benefit analysis… to ensure 
national security” requires a clarity in oversight to achieve the 
required level of cybersecurity [5]. The supply chain oversight 
aspect of the NIS Directive in particular requires a substantial 
effort to assume responsibility for the cybersecurity of supply 
chain tiers.  
 
Finding a way to measure the performance of cyber 
security work programmes is challenging. Forming 
quantitative measures of progress is taking time so there is a 
lack of data on the impact of the current National Cyber 
Security Programme [1]. There are questions around how to 
determine the relative contribution of each component of the 
strategy and how to assign values to the results of each 
component and to the overall outcomes, against the cost of the 
strategy [7]. Accountability must be clearly defined for 
measurement to be possible. Actions being measured need to 
be attributed to an individual or team or organisation i.e. it 
needs to be clear that their actions are the ones influencing the 
measured activity. “Performance measures should measure 
something that the organisation can reasonably be expected to 
influence” [8]. 
A common framework for performance measurement, that 
can be adopted by all relevant stakeholders, would enable 
better co-ordination and joined-up working across 
cybersecurity preparations and response [8]. The cross-
government approach inherent in the Cyber Security 
Programme requires an overarching governance activity to 
maximise its effectiveness.  
A review of National Security Capability in 2018 
suggested ring-fencing cyber security within government 
department budgets to maintain it as a priority. This approach 
would require a coordinated strategy with “accountability for 
performance, risk and financial management” [1]. The 
 National Security capability review recommended improving 
accountability in a way that would shift incentives towards a 
more holistic approach across departments [9].  
Forming the latest threat landscape requires multiple 
contributions and accountability. The Capability Review 
committed to ensuring the implementation of the National 
Cyber Security Strategy “keeps pace with the threat”[9]. This 
essentially requires continual re-assessment of the latest 
threats and making adjustments to the implementation where 
necessary to ensure activities are re-aligned with the latest 
risks.  
A. NIS Scope & Beyond 
The definitions of NIS relevant assets by each OES, to 
decide the scope for the CAF assessment, have included the 
supply chain to varying degrees. Figure 2 indicates the 
potential spheres of interaction with the NIS scope of assets 
and systems that essential services depend upon. In addition to 
external suppliers providing products and services that support 
the essential service, internal suppliers from enterprise spaces 
are interacting with the Operational Technology (OT) 
environment. There is also the continued malicious attempts to 
interact with critical networks and systems causing potential 
cyber incidents [10], [11]. 
IV. APPROACHES 
Distinct approaches to NIS implementation by separate 
Competent Authorities overseeing different sectors are 
explored below following interviews and discussions with 
those sectors.  
A. Competent Authority 1 (CA1) 
This sector already had various regulations to meet before 
NIS came into effect. These were essentially safety focused. 
Both the OES and CA1 have separate teams dealing with 
safety and cyber security.  The different safety specialisms are 
 
Figure 2 NIS Scoping Boundary 
operating separately with some cyber security included. There 
is a move towards a more integrated approach between safety 
and cyber security with a long-term goal (4-5yrs) to have 
umbrella rules in place over cyber and safety together. Safety 
risks are meticulously documented, there is a side project 
ongoing by CA1 to apply cyber security to those risks [10], 
[12].  
 
The scoping exercise CA1 have expected all OES to carry 
out, to identify NIS relevant assets, has brought together 
skillsets from right across OES organisations. IT and 
cybersecurity teams could not decide independently what was 
in scope, interactions with engineers, safety experts, 
operations etc. agreed the NIS scope for the whole 
organisation [12]. 
 
CA1 are using a matrix approach to assess the complexity 
of different facilities. They use this complexity level to decide 
which sites need auditing. They also decide how much time 
each should be given by auditors based on their latest 
performance review. On-going improvement and therefore the 
frequency of audits is also determined through this 
performance-based oversight. Some key suppliers to the 
industry are already in scope for audits due to being directly 
regulated under other regulations besides the NIS Directive 
[12]. 
 
CA1 have set up a framework to accredit cyber 
professionals to be auditors for their sector. The skillsets for 
accreditation have emphasised OT and ICS experience more 
than experience specific to the sector because the OESs 
already have that expertise so are more in need of cyber 
expertise for their audits and recommendations. In the longer 
term (2-3yrs) there could be potential for other sectors to tap 
into this network of cyber professionals including supply 
chains. This may also encourage some consistency across 
sectors [10], [12]. 
 
CA1 have pre-defined a profile to show expectations on 
the OES, what they expect to be achieved or partially 
achieved. Previous regulations they were working to used a 
prescriptive approach with yes or no type checklists. They 
prefer the outcome focused approach of the CAF for this 
context [12]. 
 
With regard to the notification of OES changes to CA1. 
While the safety cases are more intricate in the concept of 
change management, a simpler change process has been 
adopted for NIS. CA1 have given clear information on what 
changes need to be notified to them by OES, such as: 
 
• Changes to the scope and the security boundary 
of critical assets (assets in scope of NIS). 
• Change of supplier. 
• Contact information [12]. 
 
Figure 3 presents a comparison of CA approaches to NIS.
  
Figure 3 Comparing CA Approaches to NIS
CA1 see a key advantage of the NIS Directive is that it has 
helped OES to gain Board support and therefore the required 
budgets and focused attention to meet NIS objectives. They 
have also received contact from smaller organisations that are 
not identified as OES but are interested in applying the CAF to 
their setting. This indicates there is interest and importance, 
beyond NIS implementation, to put resources into cyber 
security preparations [12]. 
 
At this point the supply chain is not directly in scope for 
NIS (other than through the responsibility on OES to secure 
their essential services including the supplier aspect to that). 
OESs are expected to provide a list of suppliers to CA1 and 
what they are supplying. OESs are responsible for managing 
their own risks. If they select a supplier with less security, for 
say lower costs, then they are expected to manage the risks 
associated with that decision [12], [13]. 
 
CA1 recognises a use for some measurement of supply 
chains that would show when a threshold is reached that 
indicates particular suppliers should be directly in scope of 
NIS. Some suppliers are already in scope under other 
regulations besides NIS. Some OES are passing on 
requirements to their supply chain and requesting supplier 
self-assessments [12], [13]. 
 
B. Competent Authority 2 (CA2) 
Rather than adding a new cybersecurity and NIS team, 
CA2 is developing an integrated approach to safety and 
cybersecurity and building the cybersecurity capability from 
within their existing regulatory role. The definition of scope is 
inclusive of the requirements of both safety and cybersecurity 
regulations. Both safety and cyber security risks are assessed 
and the highest risks determine the actions and 
countermeasures taken [12]. 
 
CA2’s existing audit and inspection activity includes 
cybersecurity as a potential cause of a safety incident. Sites 
that come under both safety regulations and the NIS Directive 
are being inspected against safety only, until a framework and 
training are in place by April 2020 to audit against NIS also. 
At this point, advice for NIS compliance is being given while 
enforcing safety regulations. Once the underlying systems and 
processes required to regulate against NIS are in place and 
training is complete, then the NIS enforcement activity will 
commence. Having both regulations in place will ensure a 
better coverage of issues at each facility. Direct causation of 
personal and environmental safety has so far been covered 
through safety regulations. The NIS implementation will 
ensure the indirect cyber causes of safety or environmental 
issues is added to the picture of risks [11]. 
 
Likewise, many of their OT sites are at the beginning of 
implementing security. The cybersecurity knowledge and 
implementations are growing steadily from within existing 
teams, with the OT teams gradually including new 
cybersecurity requirements. Supply chains are just one aspect 
of a considerable new work effort [10]. 
 
The self-assessments and improvement plans, being 
provided to CA2, provide a picture of different maturity levels 
and timescales of compliance across 70 sites, indicating in 
what areas better guidance is needed. Information is shared 
Competent Authority 1 Competent Authority 2 Competent Authority 3
Expectations 
on OES
CAF profile of NIS outcomes to be 
achieved. 
Assess safety and cybersecurity risks together and 
take action to mitigate the highest risks. 
Achieve a baseline capability 
defined in sector CAF. 
Safety and 
cybersecurity
Separate safety and cyber teams.
Gradual integration in longer term.
Integrated approach to safety and security. Focus on cyber causing safety 
impacts to operational systems. 
Planning 
inspections
Assess risk and complexity of 
facility & latest performance 
review.
Screening of self-assessments and improvement 
plans decides the priority for inspections. 
Focus on cross-sector awareness 
raising and establishing baseline 
security requirements.
Auditors Outsourcing audits through 
accreditation of cyber professionals 
with OT and ICS experience.
Building cybersecurity capability into existing 
regulatory role. Inspecting compliance level and 
setting actions to improve compliance. 
Cybersecurity being integrated 
into existing inspectorate role. 
Overseeing 
the changes
OES to notify changes in NIS scope 
or  changes of supplier to CA. 
Scope definition includes requirements of both 
safety and cybersecurity regulations. 
Offering cybersecurity training to 
OT staff. 
Supply Chain Compiling list of suppliers and what 
is being supplied to OES.
Responsibility is on OES to secure 
the supply chain aspect of their 
essential services.
Supply chains are one aspect of a considerable new 
implementation effort.
OES must assure cybersecurity capability of 
organisations interacting with their NIS scope.  
Awareness raising through supply 
chain briefings for whole sector. 
 with NCSC for guidance to be improved in weaker areas. The 
screening of the assessments and plans received from each site 
is used to decide which sites to prioritise with inspections. 
These inspections will aim to conclude how compliant a site 
actually is and set further actions, as required, to improve 
compliance [11]. 
 
Each individual site must define which network and 
information system zones are important to their essential 
services. Levels 0 through to 3 of the Purdue model [14] are 
regulated already for the prevention of safety incidents. The 
NIS sites also have infrastructure that live within IT at levels 4 
and 5 of the Purdue model. Anything that interacts with these 
zones, with physical or logical access, the OES has security 
responsibility for under NIS. The OES therefore needs 
assurance of the competence of organisations interacting with 
their NIS scope. For example, if a data centre in another 
country is being used, Competent Authorities cannot regulate 
beyond their borders but the NIS Directive expects OES to be 
using appropriate levers and contractual arrangements to meet 
their security requirements. The legal duty sits with the NIS 
site in this context unless contracts are in place to effectively 
share responsibilities [10]. CA2 will assess: 
 
• Evidence that a supplier is fit for purpose.  
• If reasonable measures are being taken by the NIS 
site to communicate and enforce security 
requirements. 
• If the NIS site is taking a proportionate approach to 
meeting essential requirements, eg if processes are in 
place for bringing hardware onto site, or for secure 
remote software changes etc [11]. 
  
C. Competent Authority 3 (CA3) 
Competent Authorities, with guidance from the NCSC, are 
setting expectations on the OES in their sector by defining a 
CAF profile to achieve. CA3’s approach to this demonstrates 
the initial focus of NIS implementation has been about 
achieving a baseline capability. Their emphasis is currently on 
what is achievable rather than using a more risk-based 
approach to decide what is important. While the NIS Directive 
is aiming towards a level of cyber resilience towards well-
resourced and capable adversaries, CA3 have set an initial 
target to achieve a baseline profile, aiming at a level more 
appropriate for limited capability. This stage is essentially 
about awareness raising and establishing a baseline [10], [12]. 
 
Moving to a higher level of cybersecurity capability will 
require a closer analysis of risks to this sector, to emphasise 
the elements of the CAF that have the most influence on 
reducing those risks. A framework for performance 
measurement would enable the monitoring of progress, drive 
improvements and facilitate needed interventions.  
V. BROADER FRAMEWORKS OF ASSURANCE 
Aside from the NIS Directive, the NCSC provide general 
Supply Chain Guidance which holds similar expectations of 
supply chain visibility and the achievement of an appropriate 
level of control [15]. The NIS Directive itself has focused on 
assessing individual OES and requires our dependence on 
international supply chains to be met by “appropriate and 
proportionate” measures taken by OES to secure them. While 
there is a reliance on third parties, it is expected that the 
responsibility for protecting the essential service remains with 
the OES [2]. Despite the Supply Chain Guidance offered and 
the requirements of the NIS Directive, a more “robust supply-
chain framework for cybersecurity” is needed to assist this 
accountability [16]. This implies a broader oversight of 
activities is required than the individual responses of OES. 
The intention of such a framework would be to: 
• Assess the broader impact of NIS on the resilience of 
essential services.  
• Widen cyber maturity assessment to consider 
dependencies across supply chains. 
• Inform interventions by accountable parties. 
• Provide cross-sector insights. 
• Improve oversight and governance activity within 
and across sectors.  
A. NCSC Supply Chain Guidance 
The guidance coming from NCSC outlines four key stages 
to supply chain security [15]: 
 
1. Understand the risks 
2. Establish Control 
3. Check your arrangements 
4. Continuous improvement. 
 
The first stage of understanding risk essentially should 
expand into managing those risks. Establishing an achievable 
level of control involves defining and agreeing supply chain 
involvement in the cybersecurity process of protection, 
detection, response and recovery. Checking agreements and 
contractual arrangements requires a regular assessment of 
suppliers’ contributions to cybersecurity capability. Achieving 
a cycle of continuous improvement would be aided by 
managing dependencies on suppliers to achieve the required 
improvements.  
 
Figure 4 demonstrates some of the activities required in 
each of these four stages and indicates that continuous 
checking of supply chain arrangements will require a 
performance monitoring activity in order to identify 
interventions and improvements where most needed.   
 
  
Figure 4 Supply Chain Activity 
The information gathering activity in ‘Understand the 
risks’ must be ongoing and linked to ‘Continuous 
Improvement’ hence it has been described here as a 
Governance activity that includes agreeing accountability and 
assigning ownership of the risks. 
 
The following chart in Figure 5 expands further this 
Governance activity. In order to ‘Know the Risks’ OES are 
including cyber security assessments in their procurement 
processes to understand the risks presented by each new 
supplier. This is enabling a level of importance to an OES’s 
essential service to be assigned to each supplier and a 
corresponding response in terms of assuring a suppliers’ 
compliance with security requirements. The level of oversight 
of suppliers is prioritised according to their involvement in 
providing and supporting critical assets and services within the 
scope of NIS. Achieving this with existing suppliers as 
contracts are renewed to include cybersecurity requirements is 
a more gradual, long term process.  
 
The return of procurement questionnaires by amenable 
suppliers is providing a partial picture but is a long way off the 
more complete visibility required to really ‘Know the Risks’ 
[10][13][17]. Individual security questionnaires coming from 
each customer are causing a considerable overhead for 
suppliers. With a fair proportion of this activity covering 
common ground, this points to potential for developing 
common methods and improving efficiencies in security 
assurance. For a more effective accountability, roles and 
responsibilities and achievable goals need to be clearly 
articulated with a consensus on the value of the defined 
approach [18]. The value-add in procurement processes could 
be improved upon through better analysis of responses to the 
question set and sufficient follow up to ensure requirements 
are met [6]. 
 
Figure 5 Supply Chain Governance 
Guidance on potential attack scenarios to prepare for 
would also assist in focusing activity towards evolving threats. 
The NIS Directive expects OES to know and understand their 
risks and the threats to their sector. However, the uncertainty 
in this area has been consistent. This is where government can 
offer a meaningful contribution through assisting OES to form 
a clearer threat picture [19]. 
 
The NIS Directive has been formulated in a way that 
assumes OES to have a hierarchical control over their supply 
chains and the CAF expects a deep understanding of the 
supply chain [20]. The process of implementing NIS is 
presenting areas of their supply chains where OES have less 
negotiating power, or a lack of choice in suppliers, to 
influence the required level of cybersecurity. Tiers of the 
supply chain are not managed or understood. A very limited 
visibility of sub-contractors is common. Longstanding 
contracts often do not include cybersecurity requirements and 
legacy equipment lacks the capability to provide security [10], 
[13]. 
 
Oversight by CAs is looking for shared responsibility 
models to be agreed with suppliers [20]. The standard 
IEC62443 on security for industrial automation and control 
systems is made up of component, system, policies and 
overview levels [21]. Responsibility for the security at each of 
those levels needs to be assigned appropriately, as suggested 
by the accountability definitions in Figure 5.  
 
Self organising networks have developed to work together 
on these issues. One sector has taken this approach through a 
committee of several OES meeting with critical suppliers one 
by one to discuss their common security requirements [6]. 
This can succeed as far as the significance of their shared 
common denominator. This OES network would also prefer to 
 be able to meet with suppliers as a group to develop some 
consistency and new norms with their key security 
requirements [6]. There is potential for governments to do 
more with coordinating and motivating these self-regulating 
networks [19]. The current ad hoc approach, while all the risk 
in the supply chain is held by the buyer, needs a clear 
mechanism to be developed that can accommodate the 
dynamic property of this situation such that changes or new 
vulnerabilities in the supply chain, that are likely to impact 
with high consequences, can be flagged appropriately [6]. 
 
While the NIS Directive is being adopted by individual 
OES to varying degrees, the actual contributors to their overall 
cybersecurity level comes from a broader set of organisations. 
Systems integrators are not always receiving appropriate 
direction or guidance in terms of clearly defined acceptance 
processes or end to end system security requirements [17]. 
Beyond knowing the risks and the current cyber security 
capability is an ongoing activity that requires governance and 
oversight to manage the: 
 
• Contributions to reducing the attack surface.  
• Contributions to understanding the latest threat 
landscape.  
• Contributions to minimising the impact of incidents. 
 
Otherwise decisions will continue to be made in isolation 
or without reference to clear security requirements or a full 
risk picture.  
VI. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK 
This section proposes a framework to demonstrate a 
“discipline of complex interdependency” and to guide 
cooperative and reciprocal adjustments by all relevant parties 
[22]. Instead of establishing control by securing component 
levels and aggregating this into achievement of the strategic 
NIS outcomes, there are multiple influences towards reaching 
the requirements of the NIS Directive. Going beyond a focus 
on the responsibility of individual OESs to secure their 
essential service, Figure 6 presents a combination of elements 
and interactions that all contribute towards achieving a secure 
essential service. By taking a cross-section of individual and 
collective contributions, it shows four different views to cover 
the diverse influences affecting the cybersecurity level 
achieved.  
 
In the Component quadrant, it considers the component 
parts, the devices and people, that make up the OT solution 
and processes, such as assurance from suppliers on the 
security of their equipment. It includes behaviours at an 
individual level, including cyber awareness of employees, 
managing contractors and considers insider threats.  
 
The OT quadrant considers the behaviour that emerges 
from the interaction of components, such as the interaction of 
OT  areas  with  enterprise  systems  or  remote  support  from  
 
Figure 6 Securing Elements & Systems 
external suppliers and interactions with potential incidents or 
attack scenarios. 
 
The OES quadrant considers the security culture of an 
OES organisation and awareness across the whole 
organisation building the confidence to deal with cyber events. 
This quadrant also shows what is achievable for an OES 
within their cost/benefit model and with the information, 
motivation and cooperation available to their single 
organisation. 
 
The Essential Service quadrant assesses the holistic 
cybersecurity for the particular service This is where the CAF 
profile for the sector is decided, setting achievable aims to 
drive sector improvements, and where dependencies across the 
whole sector to achieve an agreed cybersecurity level are 
understood. This quadrant is where a view of the shared 
responsibility model appears from what is being achieved and 
not achieved through NIS. 
 
The performance of this multi-faceted activity could be 
monitored by selecting metrics that ensure each of the 
quadrants in Figure 6 is engaged efficiently and effectively 
and contributing to the principles of the NIS Directive. 
 
Figure 7 offers another example of taking a cross section 
of internal and emerging states, considering the elements and 
systems involved, for the NIS implementation itself. The first 
quadrant looks at the progress within each NIS Scope per 
OES, with each NIS scope being an element of improvement 
for the sector.   
 
The Levers & Contracts quadrant goes beyond the NIS 
boundaries and scopes to investigate the broader influence 
from supply chain organisations. It looks at the gradual 
process of establishing supplier contracts with security 
requirements and the effectiveness of influences on the supply 
chain. The potential for cybersecurity being integrated as 
standard in supplier offerings is also considered here.  
 The industry sector quadrant considers a particular sector 
as a whole. It includes risk assessments by the CA to decide 
where to focus resources and which OESs to audit. It also sees 
the dependencies involved to reach a particular target 
cybersecurity level for the sector. It defines the response 
coming from the CA with improved guidance or support for 
weaker areas.  
 
The Critical Infrastructure quadrant contains a more 
strategic oversight, considering the interdependent 
relationships and the risks to essential functions that cannot be 
managed or controlled by the responsible OES. It offers the 
potential to develop more consistency across different sectors. 
This quadrant aims to building an overall picture of 
cybersecurity capability across each sector and enable 
decisions and interventions to improve the resilience of critical 
infrastructure.  It is important to understand the differing 
levels of capability from various actors and see how this is 
impacting the resilience of essential services.  
 
Figure 7 describes the high-level engagement activity 
required to compile a more complete picture and effectively 
monitor progress. A selection of appropriate metrics would 
assess the contribution of each of these four areas towards 
improving cybersecurity and resilience of critical national 
infrastructure. Incentives and resources must be in place to 
sustain the accountability of actors and achieve the agreed 
goals and responsibilities. Evaluation mechanisms are needed 
to assess if objectives have been met and to demonstrate the 
impact of the Directive [23]. For example, in the telecoms 
sector, governments have been exploring how to incentivise 
operators to prioritise the cybersecurity of 5G networks, with 
the EU proposing a toolbox of measures to guide member 
states in securing their networks [24].  
 
Managing cybersecurity risks essentially requires the 
ability to identify a change in security risks and to make an 
informed response to that change.  There are multiple levels to  
 
 
Figure 7 Broader Impact of the NIS Directive 
this activity. Achievement of the CAF requires an approach to 
supply chain risk management that prepares essential 
functions for “subversion by capable and well-resourced 
attackers” [20]. This level of cybersecurity is currently 
unachievable by OES working independently and assessed as 
individual organisations. Fostering assurance collaborations 
with a consistent approach to managing risks across 
organisations and supply chains would aid this effort.  
VII. INTERDEPENDENT ASSURANCE 
This section outlines some key activities across private 
organisations and government departments that all contribute 
to the assurance of essential services. Paying attention to 
performance and achievement in these areas would begin the 
more ‘robust performance framework’ requested by the 
National Audit Office [1].  
 
Table 1 pays attention to some of the contributing elements 
of an essential service, including relations with and assurance 
from vendors and individual human factors. Table 2 outlines 
some key activities to secure NIS critical assets including OES 
engagement with vendors and systems integrators.  
 
Table 1 Supplier and human factor assurance activities 
Components, People and Products 
 
Technical product assurance from suppliers. 
- Cyber security integrated into supplier offering, rather than being 
a chargeable extra. 
- Patching security vulnerabilities through lifecycle of product. 
 
Management of tiers within supply chain 
- Assurance of tier 1 suppliers risk management processes with 
their suppliers. 
- Security requirements specified in supplier contracts. 
- Notification to OES of decision to sub-contract. 
 
Individual Behaviours 
- Cyber skills and awareness of employees and contractors. Policies 
in place to reduce risks of insider threats. 
 
Collaborations (legal contracts cannot contain/manage the whole problem) 
- Establish workgroups, operators and key suppliers working 
together on improvements to cybersecurity. 
- Key supplier involvement in cyber exercises with operators. 
 
 
Table 2 Assurance of NIS critical assets 
OT solutions. Assurance of NIS Scope 
 
Assessing Process & System Resilience 
- Number of vulnerabilities in processes and systems and security 
controls. 
- Outstanding workload to secure, number of vulnerabilities 
unpatched. 
- Decide priorities, consider exposure to threats and potential 
impact. 
- Preparations in place for a set of scenarios. 
- Incident response practices with suppliers. 
- OT Security requirements communicated to systems integrators to 
guide their implementations. 
 
 Table 3 describes assurance actions within an individual 
OES organisation including building a security culture, a 
complete set of security policies and the management and 
treatment of risks. Table 4 considers the assurance activities 
for a whole industry sector including regulatory and guidance 
activities of the CA and the approach to managing risks across 
the sector. Table 5 outlines the strategic level of assurance 
through cyber resilience assessments of national critical 
infrastructure. This would aim for consistent approaches 
across sectors and ensure activities are keeping pace with the 
latest threats. 
 
 
Table 3 Assurance of OES organisation 
 
OES Assurance of Essential Service 
Security Culture & Awareness  
 
Process of NIS Implementation 
- Monitoring improvements. 
- Measure of organisation’s security culture. 
- Level of confidence to protect & respond. 
 
Security policies, procedures & guidelines 
- Are thorough and complete & updated regularly. 
- Approved by management & assigned to committed owners.  
 
OES Risk Appetite  
- Is	clearly	defined	&	formally	documented.	
- Security	risks	are	Identified,	Analysed	&	Quantified.	
 
Risk Register  
- Is	in	place	&	fully	complete.	
- Updated regularly & under regular review. 
- Identifies risk levels as high/med/low. 
- Shows number of risks currently untreated or unresolved. 
 
Treatment of risks 
- Risks are reviewed and audited regularly. 
- Brought within defined risk tolerance levels. 
 
Variations in security budget 
- Reflecting the ability to achieve or maintain a security level. 
- Indicating a change in risk appetite. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Whole sector assurance activity 
 
Industry Sector 
 
CA Risk Process 
- Risk assessments to decide audits. 
- Response to CAF returns with improved guidance & support for 
specifics. 
 
Consistency of risk management 
- Comparison of cyber security risk management processes across 
vendors, OES, CA. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 Critical Infrastructure Assurance 
 
Resilience of Critical Infrastructure 
 
Cyber Resilience Assessment 
- Availability of Essential Services. 
- Cybersecurity Capability level.  
- Consistent behaviours of People & Systems. 
- Evolving threat landscape, scenarios to guide preparations are 
communicated. 
- Shared responsibility is agreed for risks that are unmanageable by 
individual OES. 
- Cyber security solutions enabling new technology and new 
services to be launched securely.  
 
 
The regulatory activity underpinning the cybersecurity of 
our essential services is dynamic, with multiple actors 
participating. It requires coordination across a distributed 
accountability and effective communication across actors to 
improve their  capacity to make more informed decisions 
while protecting our infrastructure and responding to events 
[25]. 
VIII.  INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
The National Security Capability Review supported 
extending our operational reach through continued 
international cooperation with ENISA and Europol, especially  
to continue sharing information, furthering industry 
collaborations and to reduce the potential attack surface [9]. 
There is therefore a further activity to form ongoing relations 
with and contributions to the NIS Cooperation Group, where 
consistency of NIS Implementations across participating 
countries is encouraged. Outcomes of our NIS 
Implementations could be fed back into the Cooperation 
Group to evaluate the broader resilience envisaged by NIS. 
IX. FUTURE WORK 
A set of metrics to enable the oversight activity described 
here and evaluate the effectiveness of national cybersecurity 
policy is currently being developed, alongside engagement 
with several industry sectors. Clarity on roles and 
responsibilities between the public and private sector is 
essential to take this forward. Developing a set of metrics to 
oversee and drive this broader activity will establish baselines 
to measure progress against and enable high level and specific 
priorities to be decided. The metrics will aim to indicate both 
the longer term and short-term activities required for an 
adaptive Cyber Security Programme, such as long-term skill 
and knowledge development alongside the short-term 
response to evolving threats and changing risks.  
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